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Abstract
This paper sets up a Bayesian SVAR model on Euro Area data and identifies
trade policy uncertainty shocks using a minimum set of sign restrictions. We
find that rising trade policy uncertainty adversely affects the real business cycle
in the Euro Area mostly in the short term, while it has more persistent effects
on the real effective exchange rate and, to a lesser extent, on prices. In line with
the recent geo-political events, the evidence suggests an increasing contribution
to Euro Area fluctuations towards the end of the sample period. The results
are robust to alternative measures of trade policy uncertainty. Furthermore,
we show that real industries exhibit heterogeneous responses to trade policy
uncertainty shocks.
Keywords: Trade policy uncertainty; Euro Area; uncertainty shocks; Bayesian
SVAR; sign restrictions.
JEL Classification: C32, D80, E30, F13.
∗The views presented herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Bank of Slovenia or the Eurosystem. We thank Urosˇ Herman and Brian Micallef for useful
comments and suggestions.
†Analysis and Research Department, author’s e-mail account: filippo.arigoni@bsi.si
‡Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy Department. At the time of writing this paper,
the author was working at the Bank of Slovenia, Analysis and Research Department, author’s e-mail
account: crt.lenarcic@bsi.si
1 Introduction
Many developments in the global geo-political environment have prompted a renewed
discussion on the role of policy uncertainty on particular economies. We can regard
the Brexit vote, the height of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the economic policy
uncertainties, and the outbreak of the US-China trade war. The latter can be intended
as one of the main factors that have shaped economic activities over the last couple
of years. Indeed, this event had paved the way for the tightening of trade conditions,
which have curbed economic exchanges at global level. The first main contribution
related to quantifying the economic relevance of such an environment is provided by
Caldara et al. (2020). In their application on the US, they study the effects of trade
policy uncertainty (henceforth, TPU), highlighting the relevance for the real economy
with an emphasis on the contraction of business investments.
In this paper, we analyze the reaction of the Euro Area (henceforth, EA) business cycle
to TPU shocks. To this aim, we estimate a number of structural shocks identified with
a minimum set of sign restrictions in a Bayesian SVAR model setting. The choice to
identify several shocks relies on two important aspects. First, it allows to disentangle
the source of fluctuations driving the state of the economy in the region considered.
Second and more importantly, it reduces the issue that arises from sign restrictions,
i.e. the so-called ”multiple shocks problem” (Fry and Pagan, 2011; Furlanetto et al.,
2019). As in Furlanetto et al. (2019), sign restrictions are used to identify, among the
other shocks, uncertainty shocks.
The exact purpose of the paper is to understand the effects that TPU may have on
economically relevant actors, like the EA. The use of the EA as our study case for this
application is motivated by various reasons. First, as suggested by Figure 1, the EA
openness (sum of exports and imports as percent of GDP) has substantially increased
over the last 15 years, reinforcing the dependence of the EA to global market events.
Second, the proportion of EA trade activities with the US and China has also risen
significantly over the last decade, strengthening the weight of the two trading part-
ners for the domestic economy and boosting the possibility of cross-country economic
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spillovers. Furthermore, the Brexit situation will soon represent another non-negligible
source of fluctuations for EA trade-related activities and it will gain greater relevance
in the very near future, especially at the point of policy decisions.
Figure 1: Openness of the EA, US and Chinese economies - sum of exports and imports
as percent of GDP (yearly data)
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Source: World Bank.
The measurement of trade policy uncertainty is performed by including the news-based
index of aggregate TPU developed by Caldara et al. (2020). To build the index, Cal-
dara et al. (2020) perform a two-step text analysis of transcripts of quarterly earning
calls of publicly listed companies. In the first step, irrespective of risk or uncertainty,
they search for terms related to trade policy and construct a firm-level variable that
measures the frequency of relevant trade policy terms. Only in the second step they
isolate discussions in the transcripts about TPU by searching for terms indicating
uncertainty or risk. Once they obtain a firm-level TPU index, they aggregate those
indexes into an overall TPU index. The (overall) TPU index is plotted in Figure 2
and it covers the period between 1996:Q1 and 2019:Q3. It can easily be seen that
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along its dynamics, periods of upswings of uncertainty in trade policies are present.
This is particularly evident in the recent years with the onset of the US-China trade
war, as the index has risen way above its historical median.1 The analysis of the EA
is complemented with the identification of other shocks, either nominal or real, either
domestic or global.
The empirical results suggest the following main findings. First, we find that TPU
shocks have significant effects on the EA. Especially, we estimate relevant reactions for
the real Euro effective exchange rate (henceforth, Euro REER) and the interest rate.
Second, consistently with the relevant literature on uncertainty, our outcomes suggest
negligible deflationary effects of TPU shocks. Third, replacing the TPU index with a
different measure of trade-related uncertainty confirms the robustness of our baseline
evidence. Moreover, we show that TPU shocks have a non-homogeneous magnitude
on the real activities, according to the sector that we consider.
Figure 2: Trade policy uncertainty index
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Source: Caldara et al. (2020)
1We depict the median of the TPU index since the latest (trade policy) developments significantly
affect the mean values of the index.
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With regard to the existing literature, several authors have already studied the eco-
nomic effects of different types of policy uncertainties. Put broadly, there are two
strands of literature. On the empirical side, the focus of the literature is mainly
related to the measurement of the policy uncertainties. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.
(2015), for instance, study the effects of changes in uncertainty about future fiscal
policy (fiscal volatility shocks) on aggregate economic activity in the US. In order to
construct an indicator of fiscal volatility, they apply a law motion equation for fiscal
policy instruments that feed into a New Keynesian business cycle model calibrated to
the US economy. Baker et al. (2016), on the other hand, develop an index of economic
policy uncertainty (EPU index) that is based on newspaper coverage frequency. Sim-
ilarly, Rice (2020) constructs an Irish version of the EPU index. Hassan et al. (2019)
analyse the quarterly earnings conference-call transcripts to construct firm-level mea-
sures of the extent and type of political risk faced by firms listed in the US and how
it varies over time. Caldara et al. (2020) focus their research on constructing a trade
policy uncertainty indicator (TPU index) that uses newspaper coverage, firms’ earning
calls and tariff rates setting a study case for the US economy.
The theoretical strand of the literature focuses on the construction and use of several
types of theoretical models. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) propose a one-sector model
that is able to produce aggregate and sectoral co-movement in responses to contem-
poraneous and news shocks about fundamentals by introducing a capital utilization
variable, the investment adjustment costs and a weak wealth effect on the labour sup-
ply and at the same time overcoming the criticism of Barro and King (1984). Building
upon the theoretical work of Bloom (2009), Basu and Bundick (2017) and Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2015) study the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks in a
New Keynesian business cycle model setting. Colombo (2013) uses a SVAR model set-
ting in order to estimate the effects of a US economic policy uncertainty shock on EA
macroeconomic aggregates. Caggiano et al. (2017, 2020) estimate US economic policy
uncertainty shocks by using a nonlinear VAR approach. They confirm asymmetric
spillover effects, especially that the macroeconomic aggregates react more strongly to
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uncertainty shocks in the periods of economic busts. They complement the results
shown in Caggiano et al. (2014) and Nodari (2014).
Based on the recent global trade developments, there is a growing literature explic-
itly studying the effects of trade policy uncertainty and news about the trade policy,
especially between the US and Chinese economies. Handley (2014) provides evidence
that the impact of trade policy uncertainty has on exporters based on a dynamic het-
erogeneous firms model. Handley and Lima˜o (2017) and Crowley et al. (2018) papers
study the impact of trade policy on China’s export boom to the US following its 2001
World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession. Steinberg (2019), on the other hand,
estimates the effects of Brexit for the UK economy. Ebeke and Siminitz (2018) focus
their analysis on the effects of the trade policy uncertainty on investment in the EA.
They assume that economies that are more dependent on global trade networks show
a higher investment sensitivity with regards to the trade policy uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and the
methodology of the Bayesian VAR model. Section 3 discusses the results of the es-
timation of the baseline model and provides alternative specifications of the model.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
Before we move to the methodology and the results of the model, we shortly present
the descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic variables entering the model (Table 1).
The number of observations of the variables deviates between 92 and 95 due to differ-
ent lengths of the quarterly time series. The observations of all time series start from
1996:Q1, while the last observation for all the variables is 2019:Q3, except for the tariff
volatility index that is only available until 2018:Q4. The TPU and the tariff volatility
indices are taken from Caldara et al. (2020). The EA GDP indicator is given as the
chain linked volumes index based on 2015 constant prices and is expressed in trillions
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of Euro. The EA trade balance indicator variable is expressed in terms of percentage
of GDP. The nominal variables are the EA HICP index with a base year of 2015 and
the Eonia index. The Eonia index is the Euro overnight index average interest rate
of the EA interbank market. It serves a proxy for the key monetary policy rate. The
Euro REER index is given as the weighted average of the Euro against a basket of 19
foreign currencies with an HICP base and it can be viewed as an overall measure of
the EA’s external competitiveness. We also consider a manufacturing indicator data
series, that is used for robustness check of the baseline model. Manufacturing is given
as the gross value added expressed in trillion of Euro.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables entering the model
Number of Mean Standard Min. Max.
Variable observ. dev.
TPU index 95 0.43 0.38 0.21 2.07
GDP 95 2.42 0.25 1.90 2.84
HICP 95 0.89 0.11 0.71 1.05
Interest rate 95 1.77 1.68 -0.40 4.83
Euro REER 95 0.99 0.07 0.85 1.11
Trade balance 95 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05
Tariff volatility index 92 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.45
Manufacturing sector 95 0.36 0.04 0.29 0.44
Source: Eurostat, ECB, Caldara et al. (2020), own calculations.
2.2 Model
This subsection provides the econometric methodology of a Bayesian SVAR model. In
general, Bayesian VAR models impose prior restrictions over the parameters’ distri-
bution of a VAR model. The model parameters are obtained by combining the prior
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distribution with information obtained from the data. Bayesian VAR models became
increasingly popular since VAR models can usually suffer from a short data sample
problem, thus having low degrees of freedom space. In contrast to VAR models, the
Bayesian VAR model methodology enables us to include a larger number of explana-
tory variables in the time-series analysis. The possible limitation of the number of
time observations of separate variables in the model affects only the setting up the
tightness of the priors used in the Bayesian VAR methodology. As mentioned before,
Bayesian methods were popularized in recent years reflecting the progress made in
the econometric and computational tools. The usage of prior information provides a
consistent way for forecasting exercises, despite that the choice of prior information
could be subjective.
We follow the Furlanetto et al. (2019) Bayesian SVAR model setting. The reduced
form VAR model is then given by
yt = c+
P∑
i=1
Biyt−i + ut (1)
where the term yt represent a (N × 1) vector of N endogenous variables. The term
c is a (N × 1) vector of constants. The terms Bi are (N × N) parameter matrices,
where i =, ..., P and P represents the number of lags in the model. The vector ut is
the (N × 1) reduced form residual where ut ∼ N(0,Σ). Σ is the variance-covariance
matrix. Bayesian methods are used for the estimation of the above model, while the
variables enter the model in levels. As in Furlanetto et al. (2019), we specify diffuse
priors so that the information in the likelihood is dominant. These priors lead to a
Normal-Wishart posterior with a mean and variance parameters corresponding to the
OLS estimates. Additional details are reported in the Appendix A.2
2The Bayesian methodology is based on the likelihood function that follows a Gaussian distribution
regardless of the presence of non-stationarity. Therefore, it does not need to take special account of
non-stationarity (Sims, Stock, and Watson, 1990; Sims and Uhlig, 1991).
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2.3 Sign restrictions
An important part of the paper is the identification procedure. We can write the
prediction error, denoted as ut, as a linear combination of structural innovations ǫt
ut = Aǫt (2)
where for ǫt ∼ N(0, I) holds and where the term I represents an (N ×N) identity ma-
trix. The term A is a non-singular parameter matrix, so that for variance-covariance
matrix the following structure applies, Σ = AA′. As the variance covariance matrix
is symmetric, N(N − 1)/2 further restrictions are needed to derive A from this rela-
tionship (Furlanetto et al., 2019).
There are several ways to impose restrictions on the parameter matrix A. In the
identification procedure of the Cholesky decomposition, for instance, we restrict the
parameter matrix A to be lower triangular, which implies a recursive identification
scheme. In our case, the recursive identification scheme is not particularly theoreti-
cally convenient since the model estimation includes some of the fast-moving variables,
such are the overnight interbank interest rate (Eonia index) and the Euro REER.3 This
leads us to use an alternative identification procedure that is based on sign restrictions
(Faust, 1998; Canova and De Nicolo´, 2002; Peersman, 2005; Uhlig, 2005; Fry and Pa-
gan, 2011) which is however used by Mumtaz (2018) and Furlanetto et al. (2019) to
identify financial and uncertainty shocks.
The use of the identification procedure with sign restrictions is particularly helpful
when we deal with a larger number of shocks despite the fact that there are challenges
from a computational perspective. As already anticipated, the identification selection
of different shocks is based on two important aspects. First, it allows to obtain a clear
picture of the main occurrences impacting the EA. Second, it reduces the issue that
3Similarly as in Rigobon and Sack (2003) and Bjørnland and Leitemo (2010).
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can arise from the sign restrictions approach, i.e. the so-called ”multiple shocks prob-
lem”, which arises when sign restriction methodology is applied (see Fry and Pagan,
2011 and Furlanetto et al., 2019). This relates to the fact that the sign restrictions
imposed are potentially consistent with more than one shock. The ”multiple shocks
problem” is especially relevant when only one shock is identified. On the other hand,
it is arguably less serious in a model with several shocks (Furlanetto et al., 2019).
The identification procedure follows Furlanetto et al. (2019) and Arigoni (2020) that
base the algorithm on the work of Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010). The procedure starts
with drawing a non-singular parameter matrix B0. Then, we apply the Cholesky de-
composition, so that the matrix B0 is lower triangular, where K is the number of
factors. We draw a K × K independent normal standard matrix Z that is subject
to the following distribution Z ∼ MN (0, IK2). A QR decomposition is performed
on the standard matrix Z, such that Z = QR holds. Therefore, a set of candidate
impulse-response functions is obtained from B0Q matrix and discarded if they do not
satisfy the imposed sign restrictions. If so, a new matrix Z is drawn and the procedure
is repeated until signs are matched (see Appendix B for more detail).
Table 2 presents the restrictions used in the baseline model. It is worth saying that
restrictions are imposed only on impact (Canova and Paustian, 2011). Following
Peersman (2005) and Peersman and Straub (2006), among others, we assign similar
sign restrictions to the demand, supply and monetary policy shocks (Table 2).4 To
deal with potential issues of endogeneity, we assume that demand, supply and mon-
etary policy shocks do not have a preferable sign restriction on the TPU index. In
more detail, a positive demand shock increases the output, prices and Euro REER.
The interest rates consequently respond with an increase as well. On the other hand,
trade balance is affected negatively as the positive demand shock increases the need
for economy’s imports while rising prices and Euro REER make domestic economy
exports less attractive abroad.5 A positive supply shock increases output, but, due
4For additional potential business cycle shocks, see Furlanetto and Robstad (2019).
5Kim (1996) assumes and shows, especially if shocks are transitory and not permanent, that trade
balance reacts negatively when a demand shock hits the economy. Similar conclusions are made by
Ahmed and Park (1994) and Ahmed et al. (1993).
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to product abundance, decreases prices. Consequently, the Euro REER and interest
rate have room to decrease. For the effect of the supply shock on the trade balance
we assume that there are no restrictions as import and export dynamics might cancel
each other out.6 As typically in the economic theory, a positive (restrictive) mone-
tary policy shock decreases output, trade balance and prices, while the interest rate
and Euro REER increase. Oil price shocks are also identified to cover additional and
non-negligible dynamics which virtually impact the EA business cycle. Resource price
shocks are identified following standard evidence from the relevant literature (Kilian,
2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2012; Charnavoki and Dolado, 2014). An oil price surge
entails a contraction in output and a depreciation of the REER for the EA, while
prices increase.
Sign restrictions for the identification of the TPU shock have to be well thought out.
In contrast to most of the uncertainty literature, our paper focuses on a narrower
definition of uncertainty, i.e. the trade policy uncertainty, which is more specific to
international trade and economic activity. This allow us to take advantage of dis-
secting the effects of trade policy uncertainties on economic activity of a particular
economy in comparison to a reliance on a more general measure of uncertainty car-
rying various dimensions that are difficult to interpret. In this perspective, we partly
follow the considerations made by Nodari (2014) and Baker et al. (2016) with re-
spect to the effects of the financial regulation policy uncertainty (FRPU) index on
the macroeconomic variables. An increase in the FRPU index decreases the industrial
production and prices. Fed responds by decreasing the key rate. On the other hand,
the unemployment rate and bond spreads increase. However, in order to disentangle
between demand and TPU shocks, we consider additional variables in the model such
as trade balance and TPU index nevertheless. A positive TPU shock thus negatively
6One could assume that a positive supply shock affects the trade balance positively and conse-
quently reinforce the identification strategy with restricting the trade balance variable with a positive
sign. The identification strategy is based on to impose a minimum set of restrictions. Given the
shortage of evidence of similar identification, we prefer to leave trade balance unrestricted. This
assumption is backed up by results from Ahmed and Park (1994) and Ahmed et al. (1993). They
find that domestic absorption shocks (proxy to temporary shocks to income) reduce the trade balance
while supply shocks have hardly any significant effects.
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affects GDP and prices (see Table 1). Consequently, the monetary policy reacts with
a decrease in the key interest rates. The Euro REER decreases as well.7 As in the
case with the demand shock, the trade balance variable in the case of a TPU shock
also decreases (see Caldara et al., 2020).
Table 2: Sign restrictions in the model
Trade Demand Supply Monetary Commodity
Variable uncert. policy (oil)
TPU + NR NR NR NR
GDP – + + – –
Prices – + – – +
Interest rate – + – + NR
Euro REER – + – + –
Trade balance – – NR – NR
*Note: The restrictions used for each variable (in rows) to the identified shocks (in
columns). NR denotes the fact that no restriction is imposed on the response of the
variable.
3 Results
This section is dedicated to the presentation of the results that are derived from
the estimation of the model. We start with the outcomes related to the baseline
model. The baseline VAR model includes 4 lags, which, according to LM test for
autocorrelation, are enough to deal with the issue of residual serial correlation. We
highlight the empirical evidence through impulse response functions, forecast error
variance decomposition and historical decomposition. After that, we move to show
the additional outcomes obtained from different specifications.
3.1 Baseline model
Impulse response functions. The baseline model is a six variable Bayesian SVAR
model taking into account the TPU index, chain linked GDP index, HICP price index,
7Linde´ and Pescatori (2019) study the effects of the imposing trade tariffs within a New Keynesian
model. Their results point to similar considerations made for the TPU shock sign restrictions.
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Euro REER index, trade balance and the Eonia index. In Figure 2 we report the me-
dian impulse response functions, together with the 68% credible interval, of the main
EA macroeconomic variables to a TPU shock. The results offer several interesting
conclusions worth to be mentioned. Most of the EA macroeconomic variables show
a significant response to an induced TPU shock. The magnitude of the responses,
however, is not homogeneous and differs across the EA macroeconomic variables. We
can easily note that the significant TPU shock responses of the GDP and prices last
for about 2 to 3 quarters. After that, both variables quickly converge back to the
steady state. The effects of the TPU shock on the Euro REER and on the interest
rate (Eonia index) are more persistent. Especially, on one hand, TPU shocks seem to
have a lasting effect on the Euro REER as they generate Euro REER deviations from
the steady state that last approximately three years. On the other hand, the role of
the interest rate as policy instrument is well designed here. The deterioration of for-
eign demand is restrained by the easiness of financial conditions. Lowering the interest
rate, the central bank supports the access to credit to sustain the domestic demand.
Consequently, the depreciation of the Euro REER helps to narrow output and prices
contraction. Eventually, trade balance fluctuations provide an additional proof to as-
sert the scenario. Indeed, the trade balance unsurprisingly does not show significant
response after a TPU shock, emphasizing the fact that international competitiveness
gained from the exchange rate depreciation is driven by a weak foreign demand and
reduced export market (Handley and Lima˜o, 2017). This offsets any benefit deriving
from cheaper domestic goods. Given these facts, it is worth mentioning the fact that
the TPU shocks have slightly bigger short term effects on nominal indicators in com-
parison to the real ones. Referring to Caldara et al. (2020) and their analysis on the
effects of increased trade policy uncertainty on investment and economic activity in
the US, we show that the increased trade policy uncertainty also deterrently affects the
economic activity of by-standing economies in the US-China trade war such is in our
case the economy of EA. Having said that, rising trade policy uncertainty, especially
between the biggest economic players, can have deterring effects on economies on a
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global scale. From the policy makers perspective these results can be important to
take into consideration when economies are witnessing the rise of trade protectionism.
Figure 3: Impulse responses of the EA variables to TPU shocks
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*Note: We report the median impulse response functions, together with the 68%
credible interval, of the main EA macroeconomic variables to a TPU shock.
In broader perspective the literature finds (general) uncertainty shocks similar to neg-
ative demand shocks, especially in recession periods8, as uncertainty shocks decrease
economic activity and induce a negative co-movement between the responses of infla-
tion and unemployment (Colombo, 2013; Caggiano et al. 2014; Nodari, 2014; Ferreira,
2016; Kamber et al. 2016; Leduc & Liu, 2016; Colombo and Paccagnini, 2020). Taking
8Since uncertainty and financial shocks are closely related, Colombo and Paccagnini (2020) find
that, due to nonlinearity, financial shocks in recessions can act like negative demand shocks in the
sense of being associated with a fall in output and prices. Further on, Ferreira (2016) explores the
possibility that the rise in uncertainty affects the performance of financial firms, while they may
represent a source of macroeconomic fluctuations later on. Based on this, we check the Granger
causality between the TPU index and export dynamics of the EA and the pair of indexes does
Granger cause each other, while their correlation is relatively low at less than 0.5.
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into account the conclusions from the relevant literature we consider additional vari-
ables that disentangle TPU shocks from negative demand shocks. Based on this, our
results seem to be in line with Caggiano et al. (2020) who find that the spillover effects
of uncertainty shocks do not produce prolonged fluctuations on real variables (such as
output or GDP), while they generate more negative and long-lasting contractions in
inflation rates. They build upon the findings of Bachmann et al. (2013), Jurado et al.
(2015), Baker et al. (2016) that uncertainties produce different shock persistences on
macroeconomic and financial aggregates via ”wait and see” channel effect. Addition-
ally, Shin and Zhong (2020) use the sign restrictions methodology on the conditional
first and second moment responses in order to investigate and disentangle the real
effects of financial and macro uncertainty shocks.
Forecast error variance decomposition. To quantify how much of the variation
in EA macroeconomic variables is due to the TPU shocks, we compute the forecast
error variance decomposition. In Table 3, we present the results of the forecast error
variance decomposition for different horizons. In particular, next to the studied TPU
shocks, we also consider a selection the other shocks in order to widen the comprehen-
sion of the different nature of shocks that affect the EA economy. The five columns
of Table 3 report the contribution of the induced TPU shocks, demand shocks, sup-
ply shocks, monetary policy shocks and commodity (oil) shocks, respectively, on EA
macroeconomic variables at one year (h = 5) and three years (h = 13). Some consid-
erations are in order. It is worth noting that the TPU shock is the main contributor
to the Euro REER fluctuations in the long term. A share of more than one third of
Euro REER deviations is indeed to be attributed to TPU shocks.9 Supply shocks are
particularly important for GDP, especially in the long-run, while the contractionary
monetary policy shocks can be considered as the main drivers of disinflationary dy-
namics and appreciation of the Euro REER. Euro REER is also affected by commodity
(oil) shocks. These shocks significantly affect the GDP and the trade balance variable
9This result does not come as a surprise as Schnabl (2008) finds that the main drivers of the
exchange rate stability are stable trade, capital inflows and macroeconomic stability. Consequently,
increasing (trade) uncertainty could also significantly affect the stability of the exchange rate of a
particular country.
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as well, regardless of the time horizon.
Table 3: Median forecast error variance decompositions of EA variables to shocks
Trade Demand Supply Monetary Commodity
uncertainty policy (oil)
Variable h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13
GDP 0.25, 0.12 0.25, 0.09 0.30, 0.55 0.03, 0.04 0.17, 0.20
Prices 0.20, 0.15 0.24, 0.37 0.11, 0.08 0.39, 0.36 0.06, 0.04
Interest rate 0.73, 0.52 0.16, 0.11 0.04, 0.09 0.02, 0.18 0.02, 0.07
Euro REER 0.16, 0.34 0.06, 0.04 0.20, 0.15 0.37, 0.29 0.20, 0.18
Trade balance 0.13, 0.08 0.46, 0.31 0.05, 0.03 0.20, 0.43 0.16, 0.14
Historical decomposition. To assess the contribution of TPU shocks to the total
forecast error in each point in time, the historical decomposition of each EA variable is
plotted in Figure 4. Consistently with the impulse response functions and the forecast
error variance decomposition, TPU shocks play an important role in explaining the
volatility of the Euro REER during the Great Recession and over the last three years
when the US-China trade war has significantly intensified. Non-negligible support to
the Euro REER deviations is provided by TPU shocks even in the first part of the
2000s. The same story can be told for the EA prices, although the contribution of
TPU shocks is smaller in this case. The GDP, interest rate and, to a much weaker
extent, the trade balance show interesting reactions over the period of the Great Re-
cession and of trade war tightening, but no significant provision is given during the
other years.10
10In Appendix C, in Figure C1, we also plot the TPU shock series over the sample period.
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Figure 4: Contribution of TPU shocks to EA variables - historical decomposition
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*Note: We plot the contribution of the TPU shock (red shaded area) to main
macroeconomic variables (blue line).
We complement the above discussion by plotting the contributions of all model shocks
to EA GDP growth (see Figure 5). It is clear that in the downturn of the EA GDP
growth in the crisis period negative demand sided with the effect of the TPU shock
which is in line with the consideration made by Colombo and Paccagnini (2020). On
the other hand, the demand shock acted in the opposite way with respect to the TPU
shock during the US-China trade war period in 2018. The monetary policy shock
points to a restrictive monetary policy in the overheating period before the start of
the global crisis, while it proved to be accommodative as the global crisis progressed.
Again the monetary policy was perceived to be restrictive as the zero lower bound was
hit in the last couple of years.11
11Similar conclusions are made by Conti et al. (2017) in the case of the Euro area and Jovicˇic´ and
Kunovac (2017) in the case of Croatia.
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Figure 5: Contribution of shocks to EA GDP growth - historical decomposition
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*Note: We plot the contributions of all model shocks to EA GDP growth (blue line).
The recent trade tensions follow a gradual rise in protectionism. The number of
new sovereign measures restricting global trade has increased over the past decade,
while there have been relatively fewer measures favouring trade liberalization. For EA
countries, the number of harmful measures implemented or announced by its trading
partners has also been on the rise, potentially increasing trade costs for exporters and
businesses.
3.2 Alternative specifications
Tariff volatility. In the second specification of the model we check the responses of
the EA economy on the trade policy uncertainty shocks by replacing the TPU index
with the tariff volatility index. Similar to the TPU index, the tariff volatility exhibits
upswings of tariff uncertainty in periods of uncertainty in trade policies (Figure 6).
Again, it is clearly evident that in the recent years the onset of the US-China trade
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war has pushed the tariff volatility index above its historical median.
Figure 6: Tariff volatility index
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Source: Caldara et al. (2020)
In this case the identification strategy of the model stays the same as in the baseline
case.12 The results of the model with tariff volatility offer similar conclusions as in
the baseline model. Figure 7 shows the median impulse response functions with the
68% credible interval of the main EA macroeconomic variables to a tariff volatility
shock. As in the baseline model, the responses of the GDP and the interest rate to a
tariff volatility shock are stronger but less persistent in comparison to the responses of
the Euro REER and prices. Considering the alternative specification of the model by
using the tariff volatility index variable we are able to produce similar results to the
baseline model and thus confirm the conclusions made by Linde´ and Pescatori (2019)
and Caggiano et al. (2020) with respect to the effects of uncertainty shocks on the
nominal and real variables.
12We follow the sign restriction matrix of the identified shocks from the Table 1.
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions of the EA variables to tariff volatility shocks
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*Note: We report the median impulse response functions, together with the 68%
credible interval, of the main EA macroeconomic variables to a tariff volatility shock.
As in the baseline model, we compute the forecast error variance decomposition for
the model with tariff volatility (see Table C1 in the Appendix C) and assess the con-
tribution of tariff volatility shocks to the total forecast error in each point in time with
the historical decomposition of each EA variable (see Figure C2 and Figure C3 in the
Appendix C).
To test the informational content of the variables employed as proxies for trade policy
uncertainty, i.e. the news-based index of aggregate TPU and the tariff volatility in-
dex, we run the Granger-causality test based on bivariate VAR(4). On one hand, we
find that there are no evidence the news-based index of aggregate TPU to be Granger-
caused by the tariff volatility index (p-value = 0.86). On the other hand, the outcomes
suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis aggregate TPU does not Granger-cause
the tariff volatility index (p-value = 0.00).
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Manufacturing. We provide an additional specification of an alternative model that
considers manufacturing sector as the real activity proxy of the model. We maintain
the same identification procedure even for this specification. Again, we are able to
produce robust results with the manufacturing model setting as the impulse response
functions of the EA macroeconomic variables show statistical significant responses to
TPU shocks (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Impulse response functions of the EA variables to TPU shocks - manufac-
turing.
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*Note: We report the median impulse response functions, together with the 68%
credible interval, of the main EA macroeconomic variables to a TPU shock.
We also compute the forecast error variance decomposition, that shows variation in
EA macroeconomic variables is due to the TPU shocks (see Table C2 in the Appendix
C). Based on this, the contribution of TPU shocks to the total forecast error in each
point in time, the historical decomposition of each EA variable plotted in Figure C4
20
and Figure C5 in the Appendix C shows that the TPU shocks play an important role
in explaining the volatility of the macroeconomic EA variables.
Services. A further extension of the baseline model concerns the consideration of
the service industry as proxy for EA real activities. This alternative specification is
justified by the fact that we analyzed the manufacturing industry, which is a typical
tradable industry. Services, instead, can be easily considered as a nom-tradable in-
dustry. Figure 9 shows the IRFs of EA business cycle to TPU shocks. The results
match with the one obtained from the baseline specification. The only variation can be
found in the response of services. Indeed, a TPU shock is more important for services
than manufacturing. This is due to the difference financial structure and firm size of
companies operating in the industry (Peersman and Smets, 2005).
Figure 9: Impulse response functions of the EA variables to TPU shocks - services.
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*Note: We report the median impulse response functions, together with the 68%
credible interval, of the main EA macroeconomic variables to a TPU shock.
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The forecast error variance decomposition summarized in Table C3 in the Appendix
C also confirms the prevalence of TPU shocks to explain the Euro REER fluctuations.
Similarly to the baseline model and other alternative specifications, the TPU shocks
play an important role in explaining the volatility of the macroeconomic EA variables
in the model extension with services. The historical decomposition of each EA variable
are plotted in Figure C6 and Figure C7 in the Appendix C.
Changing the number of lags. We now draw a new direction to test the reliability
of the results. We inspect their consistency from a more technical point of view. We
include a number of lags as suggested by the AIC criterion. Then, we reduce the num-
ber of lags from four to two. The IRFs are plotted in Figure 10. These new outcomes
are in line with the benchmark results.
Figure 10: Impulse response functions of the EA variables to TPU shocks - two lags.
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*Note: We report the median impulse response functions, together with the 68%
credible interval, of the main EA macroeconomic variables to a TPU shock.
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Hence, we show the stability of the baseline model even to this technical variation.
4 Conclusions
Based on a number of developments in the global geo-political environment, the role of
the (trade) policy uncertainty raised discussions amongst researchers. The Brexit vote,
the height of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the outbreak of the US-China
trade war are one of the most important factors that have shaped the economic activ-
ities in recent years. In this paper we analyse the response of the EA business cycle
to the trade policy uncertainty shocks by estimating a number of structural shocks,
which are identified with a minimum set of sign restrictions in a Bayesian VAR model
setting.
The empirical results suggest that TPU shocks do have significant effects on the EA
economy, especially on prices and mostly on the Euro REER in the long term. Output
and interest are also affected but their responses are sharper but last only for a couple
of quarters. To confirm our findings from the baseline model, we set up alternative
specifications. In the first one, we replace the TPU index with a different measure,
the tariff volatility. In the second one, we use manufacturing as a proxy for GDP.
Both alternatives are robust. Moreover, we also show that TPU shocks have a non-
homogeneous magnitude on the real economy, according to the sector that we consider.
The historical decomposition suggests an increasing role of trade policy uncertainty
to explain business cycle fluctuations over the last couple years, when the US-China
trade war has arisen.
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Appendix A
We report here the details of the estimation procedure. We closely follow Furlanetto
et al. (2019).
We rewrite the VAR model in (1) in its compact way:
Y = BX + U (3)
where Y = [y1 . . . yT ]
′, B = [CB1 . . . Bp]
′, U = [u1 . . . uT ]
′, and
X =


1 y′
0
· · · y′
−p
...
...
...
...
1 y′T−1 · · · y
′
T−p


(4)
The compact VAR model presented in (3) can be rewritten in its vectorized form:
y = (IN ⊗X) (5)
where vec() stands for column-wise vectorization, y = vec(Y ), β = vec(B), and u =
vec(U). We assume error term to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance-
covariance matrix equal to Σ⊗ IT .
The likelihood function in B and Σ is
L(B,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−
T
2 exp{−
1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗X ′X)(β − βˆ)} exp{−
1
2
tr(Σ−1S)} (6)
where S = ((Y −XBˆ)′(Y −XBˆ)) and βˆ = vec(Bˆ) with Bˆ = (X ′X)−1X ′Y . We assume
diffuse priors so that the information in the likelihood is dominant and these priors
lead to a Normal-Wishart posterior. In more detail, we use a diffuse prior for β and
i
Σ that is proportional to |Σ|−
n+1
2 . The posterior is then
p = (B,Σ|Y,X) ∝ |Σ|−
T+n+1
2 exp{−
1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗X ′X)(β − βˆ)} exp{−
1
2
tr(Σ−1S)}
(7)
The posterior in (3) is the product of a normal distribution for β conditional on Σ and
an inverted Wishart distribution for Σ (see, e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997 for the
proof). We then draw β conditional on Σ from
β|Σ, Y,X ∼ N(βˆ,Σ⊗ (X ′X)−1) (8)
and Σ from
Σ|Y,X ∼ IW (S, v) (9)
where v = (T − n) ∗ (p− 1) and N representing the normal distribution and IW the
inverted Wishart distribution.
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Appendix B
The procedure that identifies the structural model is based on imposing sign and bound
restrictions on the impulse response functions and was introduced by Rubio-Ramı´rez
et al. (2010). Suppose that matrix A0 is the impact matrix obtained by the Cholesky
decomposition of the reduced form variance-covariance matrix Ω. The term Q˜ is the
identity matrix of the full block of variables substituted by any rotational orthogonal
6×6 matrix (where 6 is the number of variables) with Q˜Q˜′ = I. A new impact matrix
is defined by A˜0 = A0Q˜, where A˜0A˜0
′
= Ω holds. A number of structural models is
obtained by repeatedly drawing from the set of orthogonal rotational matrices. The
procedure is articulated as follows:
• Cholesky decomposes Ak
0
of the posterior draw k of the reduced form variance-
covariance matrix Ωk.
• Suppose condition X = QR holds, where X is an independent standard nor-
mal 6 × 6 matrix, and QR is its decomposition with the diagonal of R, while
Q is a rotational matrix uniformly distributed. Substitute the block of Q˜ with Q.
• Compute Bk
0
= Ak
0
Q˜ and check if the model satisfies the sign constraints other-
wise move to the next Gibbs iteration.
iii
Appendix C
Figure C1: TPU shock over the sample period
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Table C1: Median forecast error variance decompositions of EA variables to shocks -
alternative model with tariff volatility
Tariff Demand Supply Monetary Commodity
volatility policy (oil)
Variable h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13
GDP 0.32, 0.13 0.17, 0.07 0.29, 0.55 0.03, 0.08 0.18, 0.16
Prices 0.36, 0.25 0.16, 0.27 0.08, 0.04 0.35, 0.41 0.05, 0.03
Interest rate 0.75, 0.53 0.17, 0.14 0.03, 0.12 0.02, 0.15 0.03, 0.05
Euro REER 0.26, 0.41 0.05, 0.03 0.12, 0.08 0.42, 0.40 0.15, 0.08
Trade balance 0.14, 0.15 0.42, 0.29 0.08, 0.05 0.18, 0.30 0.17, 0.21
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Figure C2: Contribution of TPU shocks to EA variables - historical decomposition
(tariff volatility)
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*Note: We plot the contribution of the TPU shock (red shaded area) to main
macroeconomic variables (blue line).
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Figure C3: Contribution of shocks to EA GDP growth - historical decomposition (tariff
volatility)
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*Note: We plot the contributions of all model shocks to EA GDP growth (blue line).
Table C2: Median forecast error variance decompositions of EA variables to shocks -
alternative model with manufacturing
Trade Demand Supply Monetary Commodity
uncertainty policy (oil)
Variable h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13
Manufacturing 0.16, 0.14 0.40, 0.25 0.19, 0.38 0.03, 0.03 0.21, 0.20
Prices 0.14, 0.06 0.44, 0.72 0.07, 0.02 0.31, 0.18 0.03, 0.01
Interest rate 0.55, 0.32 0.24, 0.18 0.04, 0.11 0.04, 0.21 0.10, 0.16
Euro REER 0.20, 0.33 0.12, 0.11 0.11, 0.10 0.34, 0.25 0.17, 0.17
Trade balance 0.11, 0.07 0.62, 0.57 0.09, 0.08 0.10, 0.20 0.08, 0.08
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Figure C4: Contribution of TPU shocks to EA variables - historical decomposition
(manufacturing)
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*Note: We plot the contribution of the TPU shock (red shaded area) to main
macroeconomic variables (blue line).
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Figure C5: Contribution of shocks to EA GDP growth - historical decomposition
(manufacturing)
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*Note: We plot the contributions of all model shocks to EA GDP growth (blue line).
Table C3: Median forecast error variance decompositions of EA variables to shocks -
alternative model with services
Trade Demand Supply Monetary Commodity
uncertainty policy (oil)
Variable h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13 h = 5, 13
Services 0.25, 0.11 0.34, 0.18 0.14, 0.38 0.04, 0.02 0.18, 0.28
Prices 0.26, 0.15 0.26, 0.36 0.12, 0.08 0.34, 0.37 0.01, 0.02
Interest rate 0.61, 0.45 0.26, 0.20 0.03, 0.08 0.02, 0.15 0.01, 0.07
Euro REER 0.20, 0.35 0.09, 0.06 0.17, 0.15 0.27, 0.21 0.25, 0.21
Trade balance 0.14, 0.09 0.42, 0.26 0.04, 0.02 0.22, 0.45 0.17, 0.16
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Figure C6: Contribution of TPU shocks to EA variables - historical decomposition
(services)
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*Note: We plot the contribution of the TPU shock (red shaded area) to main
macroeconomic variables (blue line).
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Figure C7: Contribution of shocks to EA GDP growth - historical decomposition
(services)
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*Note: We plot the contributions of all model shocks to EA GDP growth (blue line).
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